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INTRODUCTION
Public procurement refers to the purchasing by a government of the goods
and services it requires to function and to pursue public welfare. In
regulating procurement, a government tries to ensure that it obtains goods or
services at the economically most advantageous price and that the process of
obtaining them is transparent and competitive.1 However, procurement may
be subject to secondary criteria where a government employs procurement
to achieve non-procurement related goals, such as the development of
domestic industries,2 the advancement of certain groups,3 or encouraging
environmentally friendly manufacturing, by favouring particular groups or
industries in contract awards.
Controlling corruption may also be a goal of procurement regulation.
Eliminating corruption from the procurement process facilitates the award-
ing of contracts to the most competitive ﬁrms rather than those preferred for
ulterior reasons.
The purpose of this article is to examine corruption within public
procurement and the measures that may be used to address it, in particular,
the SouthAfrican response to procurement corruption in the Prevention and
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 2004 (hereafter ‘the CorruptionAct’).4
The ﬁrst part of the article brieﬂy deﬁnes corruption and then considers the
kinds of corrupt activity occurring in public procurement and the range of
* LLB Hons (Lagos) LLM (LSE). Visiting Lecturer, University of Cape Town, February-June 2006.
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1 Steven Schooner ‘Desiderata: Objectives for a system of government contract law’ (2002) 11 Public
Procurement LR 103.
2 E g under the National Industrial Participation Programme. See www.dti.gov.za.
3 Such as the groups previously discriminated against under apartheid. See the Broad-Based Black
Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003; the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000
(hereafter referred to as PPPFA). See Christian Rogerson ‘Pro-poor local economic development in South
Africa: The application of public procurement’ (2004) 15 Urban Forum 180; Christian Rogerson ‘The
impact of the South African government’s SMME programmes —A ten year review 1994–2004’ (2004) 21
Development Southern Africa 765; Phoebe Bolton ‘The use of government procurement as an instrument of
policy’ (2004) 121 SALJ 619; Ron Watermeyer ‘The use of targeted procurement as an instrument of
poverty alleviation and job creation in infrastructure projects’ (2000) 9 Public Procurement LR 226.
4 Act 12 of 2004.
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measures that may be adopted against this kind of corruption. Finally, the
article critically examines an important legislative response to procurement
corruption, namely the requirement in the Corruption Act for excluding
persons who have been convicted of corruption from obtaining public
contracts, and concludes with an assessment of the utility of this requirement.
DEFINING CORRUPTION
Corruption as a concept can be hard to deﬁne. First of all, it is an issue that is
steeped in morality5 and ethics,6 which even in secular societies is imbued
with elements of moral disapprobation, shame and wrongdoing, making it a
sensitive subject to address.7 Secondly, although corruption, broadly deﬁned,
might offend inherent (and possibly universal) values of morality and ethics,
it has been suggested that corruption is culturally speciﬁc, with an often-
argued dichotomy between western and non-western conceptualizations of
corruption.8
In spite of these difﬁculties, deﬁnitions of corruption are not lacking. One
widely used deﬁnition states that corruption is ‘behaviour which deviates
from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding
(personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates
rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding inﬂuence’.9
Simply put, corruption is the abuse of public ofﬁce for private gain.10
Although corruption is characterized here from the view of the public
ofﬁcial, this is not to deny that corruption occurs within the private sector.
However, private sector corruption poses less of a problem to governments,
since it is less likely to become systemic and is unsustainable, as the increased
costs of doing business will decrease a ﬁrm’s competitiveness over time.
Furthermore, private sector corruption does not generally produce the social
5 James Wilson ‘Corruption is not always scandalous’ in John Gardiner & David Olson (eds) Theft of the
City: Readings on Corruption in Urban America (1968) 29.
6 John Noonan Jr Bribes (1984) 702.
7 Robert Klitgaard Controlling Corruption (1988) ix.
8 See Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim ‘Cultural differences in the crusade against international bribery:
Rice cake expenses in Korea and the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct’ (1997) 6 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal
589; Daniel Treisman ‘The causes of corruption:A cross-national study’ 2000 Journal of Public Economics 401;
Brian Harms ‘Holding public ofﬁcials accountable in the international realm: A new multi-layered strategy
to combat corruption’ (2000) 33 Cornell International LJ 159; Kenneth Surjadinata ‘Revisiting corrupt
practices from a market perspective’ (1998) 12 Emory International LR 1021; Daniel Smith ‘Kinship and
corruption in contemporary Nigeria’ (2001) 66 Ethnos 344; Steven Salbu ‘Are extraterritorial restrictions on
bribery a viable and desirable international policy goal under the global conditions of the late twentieth
century?’ (1999) 24 Yale Journal of International Law 223 at 235–6. See however, Daniel Kaufman
‘Anti-corruption within a broader developmental and governance perspective — Some lessons from
empirics and experience’ Statement to the High Level Political Signing Conference for the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption in Mexico, 9–11 December 2003, available at www.worldbank.org; David
Kennedy ‘The international anti-corruption campaign’ (1999) 14 Connecticut Journal of International Law 455
at 465; Kimberly Elliott ‘Corruption as an international policy problem: Overview and recommendations’
in Kimberly Elliott (ed) Corruption and the Global Economy (1997) 175 at 177. Countries with predominantly
non-western citizens may have accepted practices of ‘gift-giving’which may amount to bribery in a western
context.
9 Joseph Nye ‘Corruption and political development:A cost-beneﬁt analysis’ (1967) 61 American Political
Science Review 417.
10 World Bank Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (1997) 8.
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costs of public sector corruption such as the ‘contagion of corruption’11 or
the waste and inefﬁcient allocation of public resources.12
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION
Two international instruments against corruption to which South Africa is a
party, namely theAfrican Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption13 and the United Nations Convention against Corruption,14
both require the maintenance of transparent, competitive and efﬁcient
procurement systems as part of the measures against corruption. This is
because public procurement as a sphere of government activity is a major
area in which bureaucratic corruption takes place. Some of the reasons why
procurement appears to be so susceptible to corruption15 are the large sums
involved; the (usually) non-commercial nature of contracting entities; the
nature of the relationship between the decision-maker and the public body,
which is such that deviating from the public interest will not normally affect
the decision-maker’s personal ﬁnances;16 the presence of unsupervised
discretion; bureaucratic rules; budgets that may not be tied to speciﬁed goals;
as well as salaries that are not related to performance or are low.
The common types of corrupt activity in public procurement
Procurement corruption can take the form of public, private or auto-
corruption.17 Public corruption moves from the supplier to the public
ofﬁcial responsible for taking procurement decisions. This frequently takes
the form of bribes or other non-monetary inducements given to the public
ofﬁcial in order to inﬂuence the exercise of his discretion. A public ofﬁcial
may improperly exercise his discretion in, for example, deciding to which
ﬁrm to award the contract,18 or in deciding which ﬁrms to invite for tender,
or by emphasizing or designing contract evaluation criteria to favour a
preferred supplier.19 Improper exercises of discretion may also occur where a
procurement ofﬁcial decides to split a large contract into several small
contracts that fall below thresholds for complying with certain procedural
requirements.20 Other beneﬁts that a supplier may corruptly seek include the
11 Gerald Caiden & O P Dwivedi ‘Ofﬁcial ethics and corruption’ in Gerald Caiden, O P Dwivedi &
Joseph Jabbra (eds) Where Corruption Lives (2001) 245.
12 Susan Rose-Ackerman Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, Reform (1999) 3 at 30.
13 43 ILM 5.
14 43 ILM 37.
15 Tina Soreide Corruption in Public Procurement: Causes, Consequences, Cures (2002); Steve Kelman
Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance (1990);
FrankAnechiarico & James Jacobs The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity: How Corruption Control Makes Government
Ineffective (1996) ch 8.
16 European Parliament Directorate General for Research Working Paper ‘Measures to prevent
corruption in EU member states’ (1998).
17 Vladimer Key ‘Techniques of political graft’ inArnold Heidenheimer (ed) Political Corruption: Readings
in Comparative Analysis (1970) 46.
18 Transnet Ltd v Sechaba Photoscan (Pty) 2005 (1) SA 299 (SCA).
19 Rose-Ackerman op cit note 12 at 64; Soreide op cit note 15 ch 3.
20 Such as obligations under Part II of the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act Regulations
GG 22549 of 10 August 2001 (hereafter referred to as the PPPFARegulations).
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avoidance of a government-imposed cost or requirement such as fees, taxes,
or production of documents,21 and lax enforcement of contractual clauses in
order to supply sub-standard products, to avoid complying with require-
ments preceding payment under the contract or to get away with unjustiﬁed
delays.
Public corruption is arguably the most pervasive type of corruption
occurring in public procurement22 and is one reason behind the criminaliza-
tion of the bribery of foreign public ofﬁcials in international anti-corruption
instruments.23
The second type of corruption occurring in public procurement is private
corruption in the shape of collusion, price-ﬁxing, maintenance of cartels or
other uncompetitive practices engaged in by suppliers to the detriment of the
government.24 Thirdly, auto-corruption occurs when a public ofﬁcial
wrongly secures for himself or an associate privileges rightly belonging to the
public,25 by by-passing or manipulating the formal procedures necessary for
the award of these privileges. This might manifest itself where conﬂicts of
interest26 cause an ofﬁcial corruptly to favour the company in which he is
interested,27 or where an ofﬁcial uses a dummy corporation to hide awards
involving personal interest.
MEASURES TO ADDRESS CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC
PROCUREMENT
There is a range of measures that a government can use to combat
procurement corruption. These may be classiﬁed into administrative,
regulatory and social measures. Administrative measures are ones that may
not be speciﬁcally required by legislation, but are permitted under the
exercise of executive discretion. Regulatory measures are binding and
obligatory measures which may be imposed where corrupt activity is
discovered, including the use of penal sanctions. Social measures encompass
the societal pressures, shame and infamy that attend corrupt activity where it
is exposed.
These categories are not exclusive, and administrative and regulatory
measures will frequently overlap, and in some cases, administrative measures
may arise as a result of the implementation of regulatory measures. Social
21 Vito Tanzi ‘Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope and cures’ (1998) WP/98/63
IMF Working Paper 6.
22 PWC Global Economic Crime Survey (South Africa) available at www.pwc.com.
23 See for instance the United Nations Convention against Corruption supra note 14; the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials 37 ILM 1; Inter-American Convention
against Corruption 35 ILM 724; Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption 38 ILM 505;
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption supra note 13.
24 Klitgaard op cit note 7 ch 6.
25 Key op cit note 17 at 46–8.
26 OECD Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector (2001) 2; SueArrowsmith, John Linarelli & Don
Wallace Regulating Public Procurement: National and International Perspectives (2000) 39–40.
27 Hans-Joachim Priess ‘Distortions of competition in tender proceedings: How to deal with conﬂicts of
interest (family ties, business links and cross-representation of contracting authority ofﬁcials and bidders)
and the involvement of project consultants’ (2002) 11 Public Procurement LR 154–5.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL342
JOBNAME: SALJ 07 Part 2 PAGE: 5 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 26 20:30:46 2007
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2007−part2/03article
measures may also accompany the use of certain regulatory and administra-
tive measures.
Administrative measures
Administrative measures may include placing restrictions on obtaining
government patronage, licences, approvals or permits upon persons who are
adjudged corrupt. An example is the refusal to register a company or other
legal person28 where the proposer has bankruptcies, criminal or fraud
convictions against him. In public procurement such measures may take the
form of denying corrupt persons access to government contracts or denying
corrupt persons registration on qualifying lists for public contracts.29
Other measures include increased public sector ﬁnancial management,
such as accounting and audit requirements. Public sector ﬁnancial manage-
ment is on the rise, as it becomes an important part of public sector reform
and corruption control.30 As a method of corruption control, public sector
ﬁnancial management seeks accountability in terms of results, not merely in
terms of process.31 Speciﬁcally, auditing requirements are designed to
identify and address areas of leakage in public ﬁnances.32 In addition to
ﬁnancial controls, increased supervision of public ofﬁcials may be used to
control corruption. This can be implemented through requiring multiple
approvals before major decisions are taken or public contracts awarded.
Supervision of public ofﬁcials is closely tied to restricting the levels of
discretion available to public agents, which some jurisdictions consider a
necessary component of corruption control.33 An administrative measure
that may protect the government against conﬂicts of interest is a requirement
for the rotation of procurement ofﬁcials to prevent the formation of
relationships that may lead to corruption.
Other measures, directed towards contractors, include the use of ‘integrity
pacts’ or the extraction of a commitment from a supplier not to engage in
corrupt activities. This might extend beyond a commitment not to bribe,
and include commitments not to collude with competitors to obtain the
contract. Similar undertakings are utilized by the World Bank in terms of
which a bidder for a Bank-ﬁnanced contract undertakes to comply with the
borrower country’s anti-corruption legislation.34
28 TMCAsser Institute Prevention of and Administrative Action Against Organised crime: A Comparative Study
of the Registration of Legal Persons and Criminal Audits in Eight EU Member States (1997).
29 Helen Xanthaki ‘First pillar analysis’ in Simone White (ed) Procurement and Organised Crime (2000).
30 Anechiarico & Jacobs op cit note 15 ch 9.
31 Christopher Hood ‘The new public management in the 1980’s: Variations on a theme’ (1995) 20
Accounting, Organisations and Society 93–100.
32 Cliff Walsh ‘Creating a competitive culture in the public service: the role of audits and other reviews’
(1995) 54 Australian Journal of Public Administration 325.
33 Kelman op cit note 15 at 11–28; Cheryl Gray, Randi Ryterman & Joel Hellman Anti-Corruption in
Transition 2: Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999–2002 (2002) 11.
34 World Bank Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (2004) para 1.15.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORRUPTION: THE SA RESPONSE 343
JOBNAME: SALJ 07 Part 2 PAGE: 6 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 26 20:30:46 2007
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2007−part2/03article
Regulatory measures
Regulatory measures include the legislation and binding regulations that a
government may adopt against corruption. These include the legal prohibi-
tion of corruption and criminal and civil penalties and forfeitures directed at
the public and private sector. For instance, a ﬁne or custodial sentence35 may
be imposed during a criminal trial, and a corrupt public ofﬁcial will
invariably also lose his employment and may forfeit his pension and related
beneﬁts.36 Obvious regulatory measures against corruption are criminal
sanctions for bribery.Although the prohibition of bribery may not be located
within procurement legislation, it is usually a criminal offence for a public
ofﬁcial to accept bribes or other inducements in the exercise of public
functions.37
Recently, many jurisdictions, including South Africa, have followed the
example set by the United States38 and criminalized overseas bribery.39 Thus,
where a private individual is found to have bribed a foreign public ofﬁcial,
that person will be liable to conviction in his home country.
Other regulatory measures directed at procurement ofﬁcials may include
rules prohibiting conﬂicts of interest.40 Such rules may require the ofﬁcial
with an interest in a public contract to disclose this interest as soon as possible
and to take no part in the contract award procedure.41 Other measures could
require ofﬁcials to declare their assets at the inception and termination of
public ofﬁce,42 and require the disclosure of their business interests to ensure
neutrality and impartiality.43
In relation to contractors, some of the regulatory measures that could be
employed include legislative provisions for blacklisting or disqualifying from
public contracts contractors who are seen as unethical or corrupt,44 and
conversely, provisions which ‘white-list’ or grant access to public contracts to
ﬁrms who can certify that they meet minimum ethical requirements.
There are other regulatory measures which are not solely directed towards
corruption in public procurement but serve to create an environment where
corruption cannot thrive. These include requirements for transparency,
competition and cost-effectiveness. In SouthAfrica, these requirements have
35 See eg s 26 of the Corruption Act.
36 Gary Becker & George Stigler ‘Law enforcement, malfeasance and compensation of enforcers’ (1974)
3 Journal of Legal Studies 1–19.
37 Sections 3 to 10 of the Corruption Act.
38 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, Pub L No 95–213, 91 Stat 1494. See Natasha Colton ‘Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act’ (2001) 3 American Criminal LR 891
39 Section 5 of the Corruption Act.
40 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace op cit note 26 ch 2.
41 Regulation 16A8.4 of the Public Finance Management Act Regulations GG 22219 of 9 April 2001
(hereafter referred to as PFMA Regulations). Also see s 6(2)(a)(iii) of the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter referred to as PAJA).
42 See art 7 of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.
43 See National Treasury Municipality/Municipal Entity Code of Conduct for Supply Chain Management
Practitioners available at www.treasury.gov.za; Priess op cit note 27 at 156.
44 Section 28 of the Corruption Act.
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been given constitutional status.45 Transparency may be interpreted as
requiring publicized contracts; disclosure of the rules governing procure-
ment in general and governing speciﬁc procurements; rule-based decision
making and opportunities for veriﬁcation and enforcement.46 It has been
suggested that the constitutional provisions on transparency are a response to
the culture of secrecy in the former apartheid regime which was used to
restrict the access of black South Africans to economic opportunities.47
Transparency has anti-corruption implications where the rules that deﬁne
the procurement process are clear and the opportunities for contracting are
publicly available, making it difﬁcult to conceal improper practices.
The requirement for open competition is one of the pillars of developed
procurement systems.48 Open competition supports anti-corruption efforts
by ensuring that all qualiﬁed suppliers have access to available contracts, and
limits the scope for corruption-induced favouritism, in addition to removing
the restrictions to participation created against non-corrupt suppliers.
A third regulatory obligation which may support anti-corruption mea-
sures is that of requiring contracting entities to obtain the best value for
money. Best value is a policy goal that pursues the best bargain.49 Best value
supports anti-corruption efforts by ensuring that the government does not
pay uncompetitive prices owing to an underlying corrupt transaction.
However, the objective of best value could conﬂict with anti-corruption
measures where these are expensive to implement, thus causing transactional
inefﬁciencies in the procurement process.50
Social measures
Social measures against corruption are the disapprobation which society
shows towards corruption, including the shame, ridicule and disgrace that
should normally follow the exposition of corrupt activity. Social sanctions
are hardly used as primary instruments against corruption, since they are
largely informal and unorganized. Nevertheless, they might accompany the
45 Section 217 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See Chaskalson P in South
African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC) para 4: ‘Corruption and
maladministration are inconsistent with the rule of law and the fundamental values of our Constitution.
They undermine the constitutional commitment to human dignity, the achievement of equality and the
advancement of human rights and freedoms. They are the antithesis of the open, accountable, democratic
government required by the Constitution. If allowed to go unchecked and unpunished they will pose a
serious threat to our democratic State.’ See Clive Plasket ‘Tendering for government contracts: Public
procurement and judicial review’ in Graham Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 160–1.
46 Sue Arrowsmith The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement (2005) 430; Sue Arrowsmith ‘Towards a
multilateral agreement on transparency in government procurement’ (1998) International and Comparative
LQ 796; Simon Evenett & Bernard Hoekman ‘Transparency in procurement regimes: What can we expect
from international trade agreements’ in Sue Arrowsmith & Martin Trybus (eds) Public Procurement: The
Continuing Revolution (2002).
47 Ron Watermeyer ‘Transparency within the South African public procurement system’ in Bernard
Hoekman (ed) Unpacking Transparency in Government Procurement (2004) 173.
48 Schooner op cit note 1 at 105.
49 Ibid.
50 Frank Anechiarico & James Jacobs ‘Purging corruption from public contracting: The solutions are
now part of the problem’1995 New York Law School LR 143;Arrowsmith, Linarelli &Wallace op cit note 26
at 28–31.
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use of regulatory tools, where, for instance, the press sensationalizes
corruption scandals and publishes the names of the parties involved, possibly
at the conclusion of criminal trials. This may be used even in the absence of
criminal convictions. For instance, in the Philippines, government ofﬁcials
who were found to be corrupt had their details published in national media.
This amounted to a serious disgrace on their family name to the extent that
some of the ofﬁcials committed suicide.51 Similarly, where a supplier has
been convicted of corruption, the infamy that results from such a conviction
where it becomes public knowledge will frequently lead to a loss of business
and may signal the end for that company.52
THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONSE TO PROCUREMENT
CORRUPTION
South Africa has adopted a comprehensive anti-corruption policy, which is
part of its broader ﬁght against crime.53 A number of initiatives have been
adopted to implement this policy. One of these is the Public Service
Anti-Corruption Strategy.54 This was developed to provide a coherent and
integrated approach to combating public-sector corruption through a
combination of prevention, investigation, prosecution and public participa-
tion initiatives. In focusing on the elimination of corruption in procurement,
the strategy proposed the exclusion of corrupt private ﬁrms from obtaining
government contracts. This proposal was implemented through the Corrup-
tion Act.
The Corruption Act was designed as a comprehensive piece of legislation
against domestic corruption, and also to ensure that South Africa complies
with its obligations under international anti-corruption treaties.
The Act deﬁnes a general offence of corruption55 and creates certain
offences that may be committed by deﬁned categories of persons, such as
public ofﬁcials, judicial and legislative ofﬁcers.56 The Act also creates two
offences that are peculiar to the procurement context57 and further prohibits
a public ofﬁcial from acquiring a private interest in a contract connected with
the public body in which he is employed.58
TheAct details penalties where it is violated. Thus, a person who commits
inter alia the general offence of corruption or offences relating to
procurement is liable on conviction to a ﬁne or life imprisonment if
convicted by the High Court, or to a ﬁne or imprisonment for up to 18 years
if convicted by a regional court.59 In addition, a person guilty of the offences
51 Klitgaard op cit note 7 ch 3.
52 For instance as a result of allegations of corruption, fraud and bribery, Enron shares in 2001 fell from
$90 to 30 cents. The company ﬁled for bankruptcy in 2002. See www.chron.com.
53 See the National Crime Prevention Strategy (Department of Safety and Security, 22 May 1996).
54 Available at www.dpsa.gov.za.
55 Section 3.
56 Sections 4–9.
57 Sections 12 & 13.
58 Section 17(1) & (2).
59 Section 26.
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relating to procurement may be excluded from government contracts by
means of an endorsement on the Register for Tender Defaulters.60
Exclusion: Meaning, nature and rationale
Exclusion is an administrative remedy used by governments to disqualify
contractors from obtaining public contracts or acquiring extensions to
existing contracts for breaches of law or ethics.61 Exclusion includes
disqualiﬁcation for three kinds of behaviour. First, exclusion could be
directed at past violations of law, ethics or anti-corruption norms that may be
unrelated to public procurement.62 Secondly, exclusion could disqualify a
supplier from a particular procurement for a breach of the rules of that
process.63 Third, a supplier could be excluded from future contracts for past
procurement violations. It is in this last sense that exclusions are used in
South Africa.
The rationale behind the South African exclusions is two-fold. First, the
exclusions support the government’s anti-corruption policies and indicate
lack of tolerance for corruption,64 while acting as a deterrent against breaches
of anti-corruption legislation by increasing the economic costs of corrup-
tion. The exclusions are also punitive,65 because in addition to the
immediate detrimental ﬁnancial effect on the excluded supplier, the
exclusion can damage the reputation of the ﬁrm, affecting its ability to obtain
business from other sectors.66 In public procurement, exclusions are
regarded as punitive if they are tied to the objectives of deterrence or
retribution, and are imposed as a result of the contractor’s past conduct,
without regard to his present integrity.67 Although there have been no
explicit statements as to their purpose, the South African exclusions are
presumably intended to be punitive, since they are imposed at the same time
as criminal sanctions, and, as will be seen, no derogation from an exclusion is
permitted once it has been imposed.
60 Sections 28, 30 & 31.
61 Steven Schooner ‘The paper tiger stirs: Rethinking exclusion and debarment’ (2004) 13 Public
Procurement L R 212–13.
62 Christopher Yukins ‘Suspension and debarment: Re-thinking the process’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement
L R 256.
63 Arrowsmith, Linarelli and Wallace op cit note 26 at 41–9, see also art 15 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on the Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services with Guide to Enactment 34 ILM 718
(hereafter referred to as the UNCITRAL Model Law).
64 See the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy supra note 54; Green Paper on Public Sector
Procurement Reform GG 17928 of 14 April 1997 Ch 2.
65 Rachel Kramer ‘Awarding contracts to suspended and debarred ﬁrms: Are stricter rules necessary?’
(2005) 34 Public Contract LJ 543.
66 See the US case of Gonzalez v Freeman 334 F2d 570, 574 (D C Cir 1964), where the impact of
exclusion was stated to be ‘a sudden contraction of bank credit, adverse impact on market price of shares of
listed stock . . . ‘‘loss of face’’ in the business community . . . in addition to the loss of speciﬁc proﬁts from the
business denied as a result of the debarment.’
67 Edwin Tomko & Kathy Weinberg ‘After the fall: Conviction, debarment and double jeopardy’
(1991–92) 21 Public Contract LJ 355 at 363–5.
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Excluding contractors under the Corruption Act
The provisions of the Corruption Act providing for exclusion68 from public
contracts for corruption offences are located in s 28 of the Act. Section 28(1)
provides that a court convicting a person of the relevant procurement-
related corruption offences may, in addition to imposing the sentences
contemplated by the Act, issue an order that the particulars of the convicted
person, the conviction and the sentence be endorsed on the Register for
Tender Defaulters.69 This Register, which contains information on ﬁrms
excluded from government contracts, is managed by the National Treasury
and is available electronically. In addition, the court may also issue an order
to endorse on the Register the particulars of certain persons who are related
to the primary convict.70 This will be discussed below.
Relevant offences
There are two offences that could lead to endorsement on the Register. The
ﬁrst is ‘corrupt activities in relation to contracts’. This offence is deﬁned in
theAct to include situations where a person accepts or agrees to accept, offers
or agrees to offer, or gives, any gratiﬁcation, for his beneﬁt or the beneﬁt of
another person, in order to inﬂuence in any way the promotion, execution
or procurement of a contract with a public entity.71 It primarily covers
bribery in public contracting. The second offence is ‘corrupt activities in the
procuring and withdrawal of tenders’. This offence relates to situations
where a person offers, agrees to offer or to accept, or accepts, any
gratiﬁcation as an inducement to or in order to inﬂuence another person to
award a tender, make a tender or withdraw a tender for a contract.72
These offences are concerned with violations of the procurement process
and endorsement is therefore not required for general or non-procurement
related corruption. This is in contrast to some jurisdictions where the
offences required for exclusion include general corruption.73 The exclusion
provisions do not apply to corrupt activity occurring outside public
procurement, such as fraudulently obtaining licences or documents, corrup-
68 The Corruption Act provides for the endorsement of contractors guilty of the relevant offences. The
result of this endorsement is the exclusion of such contractors from public contracts. For this reason, the
terms ‘endorsement’ and ‘exclusion’ are used interchangeably in this article.
69 Sections 28(1)(a) and 29.
70 Section 28(1)(b), (c) and (d).
71 Section 12.
72 Section 13.
73 For the US, see FAR 9.406–2 and 9.407–2; James McCullough ‘Government contract suspension and
debarment: What every contractor needs to know’ (2004) 13 Public Procurement LR 240. For the United
Kingdom, see reg 23 of the Public Contracts Regulations, S I 5, 2006. For the EC see art 45 of Directive
2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply
contracts and public service contracts [2004] O J L 134/114; Elisabetta Piselli ‘The scope for excluding
providers who have committed criminal offences under the EU procurement directives’ (2000) 9 Public
Procurement L R 267; Sope Williams ‘The mandatory exclusions for corruption in the new EC procurement
directives’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 711.
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tion intended to secure waivers of fees, for tax avoidance purposes or to
induce the lax enforcement of government regulations.74
The narrowness of the range of offences covered might result in the
exclusions not being wholly effective in combating public corruption, as
they will only affect persons who have been convicted of procurement-
related corruption and who are government contractors. This also raises the
issue of the possible unfairness of the measures, as it means that government
contractors convicted of procurement corruption receive a more severe
sanction than government contractors and other persons convicted of
non-procurement corruption.
The range of persons subject to endorsement
An important issue with implications for the effectiveness of the exclusion
policy is the range of persons who may be subject to an endorsement order.
Unfortunately, s 28 is not exactly clear in this regard and poses some
difﬁculties of interpretation. On one reading, s 28(1)(a) is an umbrella
provision dealing with the endorsement of all persons, natural or juristic,
who might be convicted of a procurement offence.75 The difﬁculty with this
reading, however, is the resultant relationship between s 28(1)(a) and
s 28(1)(b). Section 28(1)(b) mandates endorsements where ‘the person so
convicted is an enterprise’. This clearly refers back to s 28(1)(a), creating the
impression that s 28(1)(b) stands in addition to the preceding paragraph
rather than as an alternative. However, such an interpretation will render
s 28(1)(b)(i) and (iii) redundant since the endorsements provided for in those
sub-paragraphs are already mandated in s 28(1)(a). On the other hand, if one
takes account of the very broad deﬁnition of ‘enterprise’ in s 28(7)(b),76 then
s 28(1)(b) could be read as the umbrella provision mandating endorsement of
all persons. This interpretation would, however, render s 28(1)(a) redundant.
To add to the confusion, a number of provisions appear to treat ‘person’ and
‘enterprise’ as mutually exclusive terms77 while others clearly do not.78 There
seems to be no easy way out of this poor drafting.
In our view, for purposes that will become apparent below, the best
approach is to take s 28(1)(a) as the general provision mandating the
endorsement of all convicted persons, and to treat s 28(1)(b) as requiring,
where the convicted person is an enterprise, also the endorsement of the
particulars of any partner, manager, director or other person who wholly or
partly exercises or may exercise control over that enterprise and who was
74 See Klitgaard op cit note 7 ch 2.
75 Such a reading would ﬂow from the usual interpretation of ‘person’ as including all natural and juristic
persons, see s 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957; J R de Ville Constitutional & Statutory Interpretation
(2000) 108–9.
76 This provides that ‘ ‘‘enterprise’’ includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other juristic person or legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, although not a
juristic person or legal entity’.
77 E g s 28(3)(a) and (c).
78 E g s 28(5) and (6).
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involved in the offence concerned, or who knew or ought reasonably to
have known or suspected that the enterprise committed the offence.
Further, by virtue of s 28(1)(c), in addition to the endorsement of the
‘primary convict’ under s 28(1)(a), the Register may also be endorsed with
the particulars of any other enterprise owned or controlled by the convicted
person or the particulars of any partner, manager, director or other person,
who wholly or partly exercises or may exercise control over such an
enterprise, where that enterprise, partner, manager, director or other person
was involved in the offence concerned, or such a partner, manager, director
or other person knew or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that
such other enterprise was involved in the offence concerned.
Section 28(1)(d) provides that an endorsement applies, unless otherwise
directed, to every enterprise to be established in the future, if that enterprise
is wholly or partly controlled or owned by the person or enterprise so
convicted or endorsed.
The broad range of persons subject to endorsement indicates the
government’s awareness of the fact that in practice ﬁrms do not necessarily
cease to seek government contracts because they have been excluded79 as
they may continue to bid ‘under different corporate identities and through
different ofﬁcers . . . or as subcontractors’.80 This problem has been
recognized and legislated against in other jurisdictions where exclusions are
utilized.81 Although related persons may be excluded in these jurisdictions,
this does not usually depend on the complicity, participation or knowledge
of the related person as is the case in South Africa. The South African
approach is preferable as related persons must have a connection with the
corrupt activity before they may be endorsed.
(1) Primary convict and related persons
A court may order the endorsement of the primary convicted person as well
as that of speciﬁed related persons, namely other enterprises wholly or partly
controlled by the convicted person,82 other persons who may wholly or
partly control such other enterprise83 and/or persons wholly or partly
controlling the convicted person.84 In addition, unless the court directs
otherwise, the endorsement will apply to any enterprise which may be
established in the future, wholly or partly controlled by the convicted person
or any of the listed related persons.85
These provisions raise two issues. The ﬁrst is how to determine without
lengthy and expensive investigations whether a ﬁrm is ‘owned or controlled’
79 Paragraph 24 of the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy supra note 54.
80 Anechiarico & Jacobs op cit note 50 at 172; Dick Thornburgh Report Concerning the Debarment Processes
of the World Bank, available at www.worldbank.org.
81 See eg U S FAR 9.406–1(b) and 9.403; cl 13(d) of the World Bank Sanctions Committee Procedures
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by the convicted person and secondly, whether a partner, manager, director
or other person in this ﬁrm ‘owned and controlled’ by the convicted person
knew or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that the ﬁrm was
involved in the offence concerned.
(a) Endorsement of other enterprise owned or controlled by convicted person
In determining whether or not an enterprise is owned or controlled by the
convicted person, a ﬁrm should only be subjected to an endorsement where
it is clear that the convicted person is a majority shareholder in the ﬁrm or is
the ‘directing mind and will’ of the ﬁrm, as this is the established test that is
used to impute liability on the basis of control in company law.86 Where the
convicted person is an enterprise, its subsidiaries may thus also be liable to
endorsement. This is one important consequence of reading s 28(1)(a) as a
general provision. Since s 28(1)(c) only refers to orders contemplated in
s 28(1)(a), endorsements of subsidiaries in terms of s 28(1)(c) is only possible
if s 28(1)(a) covers juristic persons. Any alternative interpretation of s 28 will
preclude the endorsement of subsidiaries, which in our view would be a
highly anomalous position.
(b) Endorsement of persons who knew or ought to have known of commission of
offence by other enterprise
Determining whether a ‘partner, manager, director or other person knew or
ought reasonably to have known or suspected that such other enterprise was
involved in the offence concerned’ is more difﬁcult, as it requires an inquiry
into the state of mind87 of the relevant people. Section 28(1)(c)(ii)(bb), in
stating that a related person may be endorsed if he knew or ought reasonably to
have known about the commission of the corrupt activity, appears to propose
two tests for determining this, an objective one and a subjective one. This is
in line with the approach taken in s 2(1) and (2) to the interpretation of
‘knowledge’ in the Act generally.
Under the subjective test, for a person to be entered on the Register, it
must be proved that he was aware that the ﬁrm was involved in the
commission of the corrupt activity. This test will be met where there is
evidence of some knowledge pointing either to his complicity or turning a
blind eye to the prohibited activity. Section 2(1)(b) further broadens this
subjective test by placing a duty on a person to ‘obtain information to
conﬁrm the existence of the fact’ where that person ‘believes that there is a
reasonable possibility of the existence of that fact’. The subjective test is thus
not only aimed at establishing what a person actually knew to be the case, but
also includes that which he believed to be reasonably possible.
86 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold 1921 AD 186; Mawere v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary
Affairs (2005) JOL 15336 (ZH). See J T R Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law 8 ed (2003) ch
8.
87 See Jonathan Burchell & John Milton Principles of Criminal Law (2005) chs 29–32.
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The objective test, on the other hand, will be met where it can be shown
that, although the person was not aware of the ﬁrm’s involvement in the
offence, a reasonable person in his position would have known or at least
suspected that the corrupt activity was taking place.88 Section 2(2) deﬁnes
this reasonable person standard again with both a subjective and objective
dimension in relation to the related person as ‘a reasonably diligent and
vigilant person having both — (a) the general knowledge, skill, training and
experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in his or her
position; and (b) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he
or she in fact has’.
Once either test is met, the court may then issue an order to endorse the
affected person on the Register. These requirements, stringent as they are,
will provide an incentive for internal monitoring within government
contractors.89
(c) Endorsement of a person in control of convicted firm
In deciding whether a person ‘wholly or partly exercises or may exercise
control over that enterprise and was involved in the offence committed’ or
knew or reasonably ought to have known that the ﬁrm committed that
offence, the approach will be similar to that described above. Thus a relevant
person may be endorsed once the court deems that either the subjective test
for determining his state of knowledge has been met, or the objective test in
determining the knowledge of a reasonable person in his position has been
met. The inclusion of ‘other person’ in s 28 (1)(b)(ii) allows holding or parent
companies to be endorsed following conviction of their subsidiaries.
(d) Endorsement of firms to be established in future
The Act permits the endorsement of ﬁrms to established in future by the
convicted person or any of the related persons liable to endorsement.90
Although the provisions are silent as to whether the endorsement can apply
to ﬁrms established beyond the time when the endorsement ceases, it is clear
that such an endorsement will only apply to future ﬁrms established by the
primary convicted or endorsed person as long as his endorsement remains in
88 This interpretation found support in the parliamentary deliberations on the Corruption Bill where it
was stated that there should be some form of knowledge or participation that could be attributed to a person
in relation to the commission of the relevant offence. See statement of Chairperson Adv J de Lange,
Parliamentary Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee Deliberations, 16 October
2003, available at www.pmg.org.za. In this regard, the committee deliberating the Bill was ensuring that
knowledge of the offence could be imputed to a related person where a reasonable person in the place of the
related person would have been aware of the corrupt activity. Although the drafting history of legislation is
traditionally not relied upon to interpret the provisions of a statute in South African law, such background
information may indeed be helpful to ascertain the mischief at which the particular provision was aimed and
is increasingly relied upon, especially in the constitutional context, see De Ville op cit note 75 at 226–32.
89 US Department of State Fighting Global Corruption: Business Risk Management (2003) 3–7.
90 Section 28(1)(d).
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place. This is similar to what obtains under the World Bank debarment
procedures.91
(e) Endorsement of sister enterprises
One curious omission from the list of related persons that may be liable to
endorsement is persons that may be conveniently called ‘sister enterprises’.
These are other ﬁrms that are owned or controlled by persons in control of
convicted ﬁrms or ﬁrms related to convicted ﬁrms. It seems strange that such
ﬁrms are not open to endorsement in terms of the Act while future ﬁrms to
be established by those in control of convicted ﬁrms are. The only difference
between such future ﬁrms and sister enterprises is the date they are
established. This seems hardly to be a convincing reason for treating them
differently. It stands to reason that where an enterprise is convicted of corrupt
activity and subsequently endorsed and those persons in control of such
enterprise are also endorsed because of their active involvement in the
corrupt activity, sister enterprises pose similar corruption risks.Allowing such
sister enterprises to operate without endorsement simply invites the
continuation of corrupt activities under the guise of other legal entities.
However, establishing whether a particular ﬁrm is owned or controlled by
a convicted person or person in control of a convicted person is not an easy
matter. For instance, empirical evidence shows that even when ﬁrms have
been excluded from government contracts they are still often able to secure
contracts through a complex network of subsidiaries, afﬁliates and related
companies owned by the same proprietors of the excluded ﬁrm. This is
possible partly because of the prohibitive costs of investigating the networks
of company ownership (it costs an estimated $2000 to $10 000 to investigate
an applicant for a public contract), and also because such ﬁrms are not averse
to denying previous convictions.92
One potential route to address the concern regarding sister enterprises is
through s 28(1)(a)(iii) or s 28(1)(b)(iii). These provisions permit the court, in
addition to ordering the endorsement of the convicted person/enterprise
and the named categories of related persons, to make ‘any other order of the
court consequent thereupon’. A broad interpretation of these clauses may
allow the court the ﬂexibility to make an order to endorse a person not
speciﬁcally named within the Act, such as sister enterprises. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the courts will employ these provisions in this
manner.
(2) Persons implicated by the conviction
A relevant issue concerns the provision in the Regulations regarding the
Register for Tender Defaulters,93 which, in specifying the information that
ought to be listed in the Register, includes the ‘names of persons identiﬁed
91 Clause 13(d) of the World Bank Sanctions Committee Procedures supra note 81.
92 Anechiarico & Jacobs op cit note 50 at 162–72.
93 GG 27365 of 11 March 2005 (hereafter Register Regulations).
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by the court of law to have been implicated by the conviction’94 as well as
‘enterprises linked to the convicted enterprise’.95 These Register Regula-
tions appear to go beyond the scope of the Corruption Act in two respects.
First, in calling for the endorsement of ﬁrms linked to a convicted ﬁrm — at
least part of this category of persons is, as indicated above, omitted from the
Act. Secondly, they appear to imply that those persons ‘implicated by the
conviction’ need not have been on trial themselves. They consequently
would not have had an opportunity to defend themselves, and this raises the
issue of the lack of due process that may attend the endorsement of such
persons.96
Further, it is not clear whether the Register Regulations refer to the
category of related persons liable to endorsement by s 28(1)(b) and (c) of the
Act, or include persons unrelated to the primary convicted person in a
business sense but implicated during the trial. If the Register Regulations
refer to a category of persons unrelated to the primary convicted person in a
business sense and not contemplated by theAct, then clariﬁcation is required
on the ‘degree of implication’ and circumstances that will warrant such a
mention in the Register. It is also unclear whether the inclusion of such a
person on the Register is an endorsement with the same consequences as the
endorsement of the primary convicted person, or whether it merely serves as
a warning to public bodies that the integrity of those persons is in doubt. If
the latter is the case, then theAct clearly does not provide any legislative basis
for it.
It is suggested that the Register Regulations are ineffective in so far as they
conﬂict with the Corruption Act on the basis of the ultra vires doctrine.97
Since theAct provides that an endorsement on the Register should only take
effect after any appeal against the conviction or sentence has been ﬁnalized
by the court,98 or may operate on the basis of the relationship between the
primary convicted person and related persons, it is clear that the Act did not
contemplate the endorsement of a non-related person. A related person is
tainted by the conviction of the primary convicted person, and thus
justiﬁably subject to sanctions, either because the related person knew or
ought to have known that the corrupt activity took place, or because it may
be assumed that they are an indivisible entity or form part of a ‘unitary
organisation of personal, tangible and intangible elements’ pursuing speciﬁc
94 Regulation 1(g) of the Register Regulations.
95 Regulation 1(h) of the Register Regulations.
96 Procedural fairness is a requirement of the exclusion process in other jurisdictions. See Transco Security
Inc. of Ohio v Freeman 639 F 2d 318 (1981) at 323 where it was held that insufﬁcient information was made
available to the contractors to enable them to make representations in response to their proposed exclusion.
Similarly, in Victoria v Master Builders’Association of Victoria (1994) 7 VAR 278 it was held that contractors had
a legitimate interest in protecting their reputations or at least defending their reputations against a proposed
blacklisting.
97 Phoebe Bolton ‘The exclusion of contractors from government contract awards’ (2006) 10 Law,
Democracy and Development 25.
98 Section 28(3)(b).
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economic aims that are determined in the same way,99 or because that one
ﬁrm is merely a façade for the attainment of the corrupt objectives.100
(3) Subcontractors
Although the Act does not mention subcontractors, a procuring entity may
have to decide whether a main contractor may use an endorsed subcontrac-
tor in a public contract. The use of subcontractors is permitted in public
contracts, in so far as the subcontracting is done in accordance with the terms
of the contract.101 As contractual provisions may not override the Act which
obliges government departments to ignore any offer tendered by a person who
is endorsed on the Register and further oblige a public body to disqualify any
such person or enterprise from making any offer or from obtaining any
agreement relating to the procurement of a speciﬁc supply or service,102 these
provisions may be interpreted as prohibiting a public body from entering
into a contract involving a convicted subcontractor.
The procuring entities which must abide by the endorsement order
Section 28(3)(a)(iii) of the Corruption Act provides that, once the Register
has been endorsed, ‘the National Treasury, the purchasing authority or any
government department’ must either ignore any tender made by the person
or ﬁrm subject to the endorsement, or disqualify that person or ﬁrm from
making any offer or obtaining any agreement in relation to the procurement
of goods and services. When this is read in conjunction with the PFMA
Regulations which apply to all national and provincial authorities and oblige
public bodies to consult the Register before awarding a contract to ensure
that a bidder has not been endorsed,103 it is evident that the exclusions under
the CorruptionAct are to be applied by all the departments that are subject to
the PFMARegulations, as well as the bodies speciﬁed in s 28(3)(a)(iii).
The endorsement will thus be acted on by all national and provincial
departments,104 the National Treasury, and public entities such as parastatals
and other bodies designated by the Public Finance Management Act
(hereafter referred to as the PFMA).105 Although no enforcement mecha-
nism exists to ensure that public bodies consult the Register and comply with
the order, it is possible that a failure to consult the Register will be regarded
as a dereliction of an accounting ofﬁcer’s duties under s 38 of the PFMA,
which makes the ofﬁcer responsible for the maintenance of an appropriate
procurement system106 and compliance with all commitments required by
99 Ladysmith Lindgens Leathers (Pty) Ltd and Another v Lindgens Ladysmith Trimming (Pty) Ltd and Another
(1997) JOL 1507(SE).
100 Airlink Pilots Association SA v SA Airlines (Pty) Ltd [2001] 6 BLLR 587 (LC).
101 Regulation 1(n) PPPFARegulations supra note 20.
102 Section 28(3)(a)(iii).
103 Regulation 16A9.1(c) of the PFMARegulations supra note 41.
104 Section 3(a) of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999.
105 Section 3(b) of the PFMA.
106 Section 38(1)(a)(iii) of the PFMA.
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legislation.107 There is also the possibility that a procurement decision
following a failure to consult the Register could be reviewable under
s 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA ‘because . . . relevant considerations were not consid-
ered’.
The duration of the endorsement
Under the Corruption Act, it is the National Treasury, and not the court,
that determines the period of time for which an endorsement will remain on
the Register.108 This separation of functions between the body imposing the
endorsement and the body prescribing its duration might lead to delays
between the time when the order to endorse is made and the moment when
the length of the endorsement is known. Although the court staff are
enjoined to ‘forthwith forward the court order to the Registrar and the
Registrar must forthwith endorse the Register accordingly’,109 it is possible
for delays to occur.
This situation has arisen in the United States, with severe consequences
for the contractor. In JB Kies Construction Co,110 the bidder for a public
contract obtained a three-year debarment which started three years and two
months before the challenged tender proceedings. However, the govern-
ment agency only placed the ﬁrm on the list of excluded contractors three
months after the debarment was supposed to have begun.As a result, the ﬁrm
was still considered debarred at the time of bid opening and its bid, which
was the lowest, was rejected as a result. The ﬁrm’s subsequent protest was
denied on the basis that the administrative delay in listing was not sufﬁcient
ground for the debarment to be waived.111
This case illustrates how easily a ﬁrm may be eliminated from competition
by processing delays.112 It is suggested that the National Treasury should put
in place sufﬁcient mechanisms to prevent such delays and, where they do
occur, should adjust the period of endorsement accordingly. Alternatively, it
may be better for the period of endorsement to be determined by the courts
rather than the National Treasury, as this would minimize the risk of
administrative delays.
There is, moreover, a serious conﬂict between the Register Regulations
and the the Corruption Act. Whereas the Act speciﬁes that the period of
endorsement should be between ﬁve and ten years, and that the National
Treasury must remove the particulars of the person or enterprise concerned
from the Register once the period of endorsement ends, the Register
Regulations provide that the information regarding a particular person or
ﬁrm should be retained in the Register for 20 years.113
107 Section 38(1)(e) of the PFMA.
108 Section 28(3)(ii).
109 Section 28 (2).
110 JB Kies Construction Co. Comp. Gen. B-250797, 93–1 CPD ¶ 127 at 2–4.
111 For an explanation of this and similar cases, see Kramer op cit note 65.
112 Ibid.
113 Regulation 3.
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It is not clear from the Regulations whether the endorsement as such
should last for 20 years or whether merely information as to the (prior)
existence of an endorsement should be retained in the Register for 20 years.
However, either interpretation conﬂicts with the Act which in clear terms
requires the information to be removed from the Register upon expiry of
the period of endorsement.114 The retention of information in the Register
may have the same practical consequences for a contractor as the endorse-
ment itself, depending on the supplier’s dependency on government
contracts. As contracting authorities must consult the Register before
awarding public contracts, any information on a contractor in the Register
may adversely affect the contractor’s ability to secure public contracts.
Since the power to retain information in the Register is granted under an
enabling provision in the CorruptionAct,115 the period stated in the Register
Regulations may not override the provisions of the Act and the Register
Regulations are ineffective to the extent that they conﬂict with the Act.
Cancellation of ongoing contracts
Where an endorsement has been made on the Register, the National
Treasury, after consultation with the relevant purchasing authority, may
terminate any agreement116 with the person subject to the endorsement,
provided that the Treasury considers a range of factors. The factors listed in
theAct are the extent and duration of the agreement concerned; whether it is
likely to conclude a similar agreement with another person or enterprise
within a speciﬁc time frame; the extent to which the agreement has been
executed; the urgency of the services to be delivered or supplied in terms of
the agreement; whether extreme costs will follow such termination; and any
other factor which may impact on the termination of the agreement.
The cancellation of on-going contracts where a contractor has been
excluded from public contracts for corruption or other breach of procure-
ment rules is a known, but not widely used concept in public procure-
ment.117 An indication of the reluctance of procurement systems to cancel
existing contracts may be found in the UNCITRALModel Law which does
not expressly provide for the cancellation of a contract, although the
guidance notes accompanying the Model Law do not preclude national
systems from utilizing cancellation in cases of fraud or corruption.118
The possibility of terminating on-going contracts under the Corruption
Act may have far-reaching consequences that may not have been considered
by the legislature. Some of the issues which will be raised by a contract
termination include whether or not the contractor will be paid for work
completed or other beneﬁts that the public body may have received under
114 Section 28(4)(b).
115 Section 33(1)(a).
116 Section 28(3) and (7) of the Corruption Act.
117 Arrowsmith, Linarelli & Wallace op cit note 26 at 785–95.
118 Article 54 para 12 Guide to Enactment of UNCITRAL Model Law. See Don Wallace ‘UNCITRAL
Model law on procurement of goods, construction and services’ (1994) 3 Public Procurement L R CS2–9.
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the contract, and whether the public body will be entitled to recover
amounts paid out under the contract. Further, who bears the costs of the
wasted procurement procedure and a possibly new procedure?
Where a contract is terminated by the government on grounds of
endorsement under the Act, this may open the government to a legal
challenge by the contractor in question. Where there is fraud or corruption
involving the contractor, however, South African common law treats the
contract as voidable on the ground of improperly obtained consent.119 In
Plaaslike Boeredienste (Edms) Bpk v Chemfos Bpk120 the court declared that the
law views bribery as immoral and unlawful and will not allow the briber to
enforce a contract concluded on a bribe or hold the innocent party to such
contract.121 This view was afﬁrmed in Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd and Another v
Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd,122 where the court refused to enforce a contractual
claim against the defendants because of the plaintiff’s corrupt behaviour in
concluding the contract. The court declared that ‘bribery is a form of corrupt
conduct that will not be countenanced by any court of law’123 and held the
contract to be voidable.124 The court further underlined its willingness to
assist an innocent party in such a case by excusing the innocent defendants
from tendering restitution of the goods or its equivalent received under the
contract upon cancellation.125
However, where an endorsement relates to a person or enterprise other
than the primary convict, the termination of an ongoing contract with such
person or ﬁrm following an endorsement may not be justiﬁable on the basis
of Plaaslike Boeredienste126 and Extel Industrial.127 In those cases the judges
stressed their abhorrence at the corrupt conduct of one of the contracting
parties to the agreement under scrutiny.128 In the ﬁrst of these in particular
the court noted that it was the unconscionability of the method used in
concluding the particular contract that led to its being voidable.129 Where
the corrupt conduct of a third party in an unrelated transaction leads to the
endorsement of a party to an ongoing state contract,130 the validity of the
termination of the contract would be doubtful under the common law. In
119 Schalk van der Merwe, L F van Huyssteen, M F B Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract: General Principles 2
ed (2003) 115–16.
120 1986 (1) SA 819 (A).
121 At 848.
122 1999 (2) SA 719 (SCA).
123 At 728.
124 At 728–9. The court made a distinction between the ‘bribery agreement’ itself in terms of which the
bribe is effected and the ‘follow-up agreement’ concluded as a result of the bribe. While the former is void,
the latter is only voidable.
125 At 730–3.
126 Supra note 121.
127 Supra note 123.
128 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 119 at 115.
129 Plaaslike Boeredienste v Chemfos supra note 120 at 848, quoted with approval in Extel Industrial v Crown
Mills supra note 122 at 728. In the latter case the court also placed much emphasis on the respective guilt and
innocence of the parties in distinguishing between the voidness of the ‘bribery agreement’ and the
voidability of the ‘follow-up agreement’. See Schalk van der Merwe & L F van Huyssteen ‘Improperly
obtained consensus’ (1987) 50 THRHR 78 at 79.
130 Such as persons in control of a convicted ﬁrm, see s 28(1)(b)(ii) of the Corruption Act.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL358
JOBNAME: SALJ 07 Part 2 PAGE: 21 SESS: 12 OUTPUT: Tue Jun 26 20:30:46 2007
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2007−part2/03article
this type of situation the lawfulness of the termination would turn on the
question whether the Corruption Act can be said to provide statutory
authority that overrides the state’s obligations under contract law.
It should be noted, however, that the Corruption Act limits the power of
the National Treasury to terminate a contract. The National Treasury may
only terminate a contract where the endorsement applies to a convicted
natural person, a convicted ﬁrm, or persons in control of a convicted ﬁrm.131
Thus, termination is not permitted where a ﬁrm was endorsed because of a
relationship with a convicted natural person or persons in charge of such a
ﬁrm.
A contract that the government has been induced to enter on the basis of
corruption is tainted with the illegality of the underlying corrupt transaction
between the public ofﬁcial and the contractor. As a result, recovery of
outstanding payments should be refused, on the basis of the rule denying
payment under an illegal transaction.132 It may also be possible for the
government to make a claim on the basis of the unjust enrichment of the
contractor,133 if the government can prove that it has been impoverished and
that the contractor has been enriched at its expense.134
In determining whether the government may make a claim for a wasted
procurement procedure, the Corruption Act provides that where the
National Treasury has terminated an agreement, it may, in addition to any
other legal remedy, recover from the person or enterprise any damages
incurred or sustained by the state as a result of the tender process or the
conclusion of the agreement, or any losses which the state may suffer by
having to make less favourable arrangements thereafter.135 However, a
supplier may on the basis of contractual mitigation of loss principles claim
that the state need not conduct a new procurement procedure, but merely
call upon, where appropriate, the other tenderers in the previous process.
Finally, the termination of contracts may have extreme resource and cost
implications, especially in the construction context.136 Another consider-
ation is that cancellation may open the government to difﬁcult legal
challenges, in cases where the corrupt activity of a main contractor affects a
subcontractor, or where the cancellation arises as a result of the endorsement
of a person or ﬁrm related to the primary endorsee, or there is a lack of due
131 See s 28(3)(a)(i).
132 See Vuurman v Universal Enterprises Ltd 1924 TPD 488 where it was held that a plaintiff is only entitled
to recover upon an obligation connected with an immoral transaction if, upon a consideration of all the facts
of the case and of the real objects of the parties, the obligation sought to be enforced is separable from the
immoral transaction and is not itself tainted with illegality. See also Chipunza v Muzangaza NO (2004) JOL
12880 (ZH) where it was held that the purpose of the rule is to prevent a party who has acted disgracefully
by making performance under an illegal contract from recovering such performance.
133 Trotman v Edwick 1951 (1) SA 443 (A) at 449B-C.
134 See McCarthy Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers 2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA).
135 Section 28(3)(c).
136 It may also be noted that cl 60.5 of the National Treasury’s Standardised Provisions for Public-Private
Partnerships (PPP) contain extensive provisions permitting the termination of a PPP agreement where the
private partner, its employees or subcontractors are engaged in corrupt acts.
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process in the decision to terminate.137 Termination may not always be in the
public interest and it is therefore important to note that the provisions
regarding termination are permissive.
Derogations from the requirement to exclude a contractor endorsed on the Register
Once the order to endorse has been made, all public bodies must comply by
excluding the endorsed person/ﬁrm from public contracts.138 There is no
ﬂexibility to derogate from the endorsement order by continuing to do
business with a person so endorsed. In other jurisdictions, procuring entities
may derogate from the requirement to exclude a convicted supplier,139 or
may waive the debarment order,140 where justiﬁed under the circumstances.
For example, the EC procurement directives permit derogations from the
mandatory requirement to exclude corrupt suppliers in the ‘general interest’.
Although ‘general interest’ is not speciﬁcally deﬁned, it means, if interpreted
similarly to other derogations in European jurisprudence, that any deroga-
tions would have to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate to the
objective sought, and may not be used to discriminate against contractors of
other Member States.141 In the United States, a contractor’s suspension/
debarment is effective unless ‘the (government) agency head . . . states in
writing the compelling reasons justifying the continued business dealings
between that agency and the contractor’.142 US regulations do not deﬁne
‘compelling reasons’ but many agency-speciﬁc procurement regulations give
illustrations such as national defence,143 urgency,144 and the availability of
only one capable contractor.145
It would have been preferable for permissible derogations also to exist in
South Africa. The current lack of ﬂexibility for procuring entities may result
in exclusions that are not in the best interests of the public. The courts
operate outside the public procurement ‘realm’ and may not be aware of
factors necessitating the continuation of a business relationship between the
contractor and the government. Such factors may include public health or
public security concerns, the availability of only one supplier, the unduly
prohibitive costs of ﬁnding alternative suppliers, or the resultant reduction in
competition as a result of the exclusion of a particular contractor from that
market. Further, the South African approach denies procuring entities the
137 Contractual remedies may, where appropriate, be available against the government: see Cora Hoexter
with Rosemary Lyster (Iain Currie ed) The New Constitutional and Administrative Law Volume II —
Administrative Law (2002) 167.
138 Section 28(3)(a)(iii).
139 Article 45 of the Directive on the coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts,
public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] O J L 134/114.
140 US FAR 9.406–1(c).
141 Case C-318/86, Commission v French Republic [1988] E C R 3559. See Williams op cit note 73.
142 FAR 9.407–1(d), 9.406–1(c).
143 Defence Federal Acquisition Regulations (DFARS) 209.405(a)(iv).
144 DFARS 209.405(a)(ii).
145 US Department of Health and Human Services Acquisition Regulations 309.405(a)(1)(i).
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ﬂexibility to deal with peculiar or one-off cases that could not have been
anticipated.
Remedies for affected suppliers
The Corruption Act does not indicate whether remedies are available to a
supplier who is wrongly endorsed in the Register. Whilst this issue may not
arise where a primary convict is endorsed by the courts, it is possible for a
person to be wrongly excluded where he is a related person/ﬁrm, or is one of
the persons ‘implicated’ by the conviction who is to be endorsed under the
Register Regulations.
An endorsement of the primary convict may be challenged in an appeal
against the conviction, or the sentence which includes the endorsement
order.146 Alternatively, where the order is issued by a lower court, the High
Court, in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction over such courts, may
review the lower court’s procedures where there is an alleged breach of due
process.147
A related person who was not convicted of corruption but endorsed on the
Register by order of the court, and who seeks to challenge the endorsement,
may not have any remedy, due to a lack of standing,148 unless the person is
able to petition the court as a person affected by the court’s decision. Such a
person would not have a remedy under PAJA, which does not apply to
judicial decisions.149
However, where information on an implicated person is wrongly entered
into the Register pursuant to the Register Regulations, such persons may
challenge the legal validity of the provisions of the Register Regulations
which conﬂict with the CorruptionAct, and in addition, would have a right to
a remedy under PAJA. Where a challenge is successful, an effective remedy
(from the contractor’s point of view) will be the setting aside of the decision
taken.150 Damages are also available in principle if a loss has occurred for which
there is no other appropriate remedy,151 although these may be difﬁcult to
claim in practice because of the problems of proving loss.152
146 The Chairperson of the parliamentary committee deliberating the Corruption Bill also stated that
‘[t]he only thing a person can do in such circumstances is to appeal should s/he wish to appeal against the
order of the Court’. See Parliamentary Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee-
Prevention of Corruption Bill Discussion, 16 October 2003, available at www.pmg.org.za. See s 28(3)(b)
Corruption Act.
147 Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co. v Johannesburg Town Council 1903 TS 111 at 116; Hoexter et al
op cit note 137 at 64–9.
148 Hoexter et al op cit note 137 ch 7.
149 Section 1(ee) of PAJA.
150 Section 8 (1) (c) of PAJA; Claude Neon Ltd v Germiston City Council 1995 (3) SA 710 (W) at 720–21;
Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) at para 5.
151 J R de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa (2003) 353–62; Olitzki Property
Holdings v State Tender Board (2001) 3 SA 1247 (SCA).
152 Søren Schønberg Legitimate Expectations in Administrative Law (2000) 202; De Ville op cit note 151 at
359. However, an aggrieved supplier is not entitled to loss of proﬁts, Olitzki supra note 151. Following the
Constitutional Court judgment in Steenkamp NO v Provincial Tender Board, Eastern Cape 2007 (3) SA 121
(CC) it may also be very difﬁcult for such supplier to claim out-of-pocket expenses where a mistaken, but
bona ﬁde endorsement was made.
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ASSESSMENT
The endorsement provisions grew out of, and are intended to support, South
Africa’s anti-corruption policy. Although they are in many respects detailed
and provide for many of the concerns arising from the use of procurement
exclusions, some questions remain regarding the usefulness of the measures
provided by the Corruption Act.
The major concern is whether the exclusions will actually be effective in
combating public sector corruption. Exclusion is only one limited tool in the
range of measures available in the ﬁght against corruption, and corruption in
public life is not limited to public procurement. In addition, corruption is
such a complex issue that even within government contracts it requires the
implementation of measures linked to clearly deﬁned goals. If exclusions are
considered an appropriate tool for corruption control, then the issue
becomes how to make this tool effective.
Although the provisions are indicative of the government’s lack of
tolerance for corruption, it is not clear how effective they will be in practice.
The provisions may be of limited effect153 since they rely on the conviction
of a corrupt supplier. Corruption notably thrives in secret, resulting in a
dearth of convictions. Furthermore, even where a ﬁrm has been convicted of
corruption, and has been endorsed on the Register, it may take on different
corporate identities, and in practice remain able to participate in government
contracts, as it is ‘extremely difﬁcult to prove that a new ﬁrm is the alter ego
of one previously excluded’without lengthy and expensive investigations.154
The effectiveness of the provisions may be hampered without clear rules on
the nature of related persons that may be subject to exclusion, both under the
Corruption Act that omits to deal with sister ﬁrms related to an endorsed
ﬁrm and under the Register Regulations that deal with ‘implicated’ persons
in a legally dubious manner.
More generally, it has been suggested that legislative intervention to
prevent businesses from using bribes to obtain government contracts may
not be sufﬁcient. Thus, ‘[t]he effectiveness of . . . a legislative approach is
undermined in a market economy where the drive for proﬁt dominates. . . .
Although some view the legal system as a cure for market imperfections, one
of the reasons that law sometimes fails to compel ethical conduct in the
operation of businesses may simply be that the potential for huge proﬁts
makes violation of the law seem worth the risk of punishment.’155 If this is
indeed the case, then the exclusion provisions, even if accompanied by rigid
153 There have been no endorsements in the Register so far.
154 Anechiarico & Jacobs op cit note 50 at 172.
155 Barbara Crutchﬁeld George & Kathleen Lacey ‘A coalition of industrialised nations, developing
nations, multilateral development banks and non-governmental organisations: A pivotal complement to
current anti-corruption initiatives’ (2000) 33 Cornell International LJ 547 at 557.
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enforcement, may not succeed in eradicating procurement corruption
without a complement of other initiatives.156
Whilst the government must be commended for its uncompromising,
multi-faceted approach to corruption control, it is clear that in linking
procurement regulation and corruption control the government must ensure
that there is maximum transparency, fairness and clarity in the way that the
provisions are implemented and the least disruption to the procurement
process.
156 See Becker & Stigler op cit note 36; Harms op cit note 8; Frederick Stapenhurst & Petter Langseth
‘The role of the public administration in ﬁghting corruption’ (1997) 10 International Journal of Public Sector
Management 311.
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